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In her recent article, “How Do I Live in This Strange Place?”, Samantha Vice (2010) 
argues that white South Africans have been morally damaged by their position within the 
apartheid system, and suggests that, in light of this damage, the appropriate course of action 
is to “concentrate on recovering and rehabilitating our selves” by cultivating “humility 
and...(a certain kind of) silence” (Vice 2010: 324). This article has resulted in a stimulating – 
and sometimes heated – debate, both within and outside of academia in South Africa, since 
its publication in the Journal of Social Philosophy. In the wake of this debate,  a consolidated 
set of formal responses to the article was recently published in the South African Journal of 
Philosophy (SAJP). These papers targeted various levels of Vice’s (2010) argument2. While 
these papers are valuable in disturbing and interrogating selected links in the chain of 
reasoning that progresses her final call for whites to “turn one’s attention to the self with 
silence and if possible, humility” (Vice 2010: 338), only McKaiser (2011) and Hook (2011) 
sufficiently tackle the conceptual integrity of the various qualifiers by which she delimits the 
kind of silence she advocates. McKaiser is concerned with the moral limits of the political 
dimensions of silence, while Hook  argues that silence is itself a social gesture, the meaning 
and importance of which is a function of who receives it, rather than just who produces it.  
These two papers do well to bring to the surface the critical importance of disentangling 
Vice’s use of the term “silence” from some of its more literal receptions, by carefully 
considering Vice’s distinctions between different types of political and personal silences. In 
our view, however, the place of professional silence (the third type of silence Vice refers to) 
in living as a white South African has not yet been adequately  interrogated. This is an 
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 These papers constitute a special edition, volume 30, issue 4. 
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especially important omission for at least two reasons. Firstly, Vice’s paper is a piece of 
published professional discourse. By definition then it forms part of “engaging 
philosophically with one’s context with colleagues and in professional settings” (Vice 2010: 
336), an instantiation of the  type of professional practice that Vice differentiates from 
political silence in various ways in her paper. Her paper is therefore itself an interesting test 
case for this distinction. Secondly, Vice notes that her paper represents an attempt at the 
“professional and personal breaking of pernicious whitely silence; ‘making strange’ what was 
previously ‘just the way things are’” (Vice 2010: 337). It is thus a personal reflection on the 
limits of the political, the possibilities of the personal, and the imperatives of the professional 
in thinking about whiteness and “whiteliness” in South Africa. Vice’s classing of the personal 
and professional as permissible modes of engagement – modes that are not (at least according 
to her) in essence political – raises important questions about the relationships between 
disciplines and their exponents; philosophy and philosophers; and the viability, or even 
possibility, of precluding the political from the personal and professional dimensions of being 
white, or thinking about whiteness in South Africa
3
.   
In this paper, we enter the field that emerges from these questions through a focus on 
the distinction  Vice draws between, in particular, political and professional silence. In the 
discussion that follows, we provide an account for why we view this distinction as 
unsustainable, before providing a brief empirical demonstration of how the potential 
problems of whiteness that Vice points out are being negotiated and contested by ordinary 
South Africans in the course of their everyday political activities. In light of this discussion, 
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 The paper is, in other words, a deeply personal engagement with the moral coordinates that (should) shape 
living as a white South African. Professional silence therefore occupies an interesting position in the triangle of 
silences that Vice discusses. It is certainly excluded from the “no-go” political realm but is also forcefully linked 
to the personal, but no less dutiful, imperatives of being a philosopher that engages with her context (Vice 
2010). 
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and in contrast to the possibility of a context-free solution to the difficulties Vice identifies, 
we advocate for the value of an empirical analytic focus on how such contestations unfold in 
the flow of everyday post-apartheid life.  
 
II. Political vs. Professional Silence: A Sustainable Distinction? 
 
A crucial point in Vice’s argument as we understand it is captured by the quote below, in 
which she draws a distinction between the political silence that she is advocating, and a 
professional (or more informal, conversational) silence for which, we take it, she is not 
calling: 
The relevant kind of silence is therefore a political silence, silence in the political 
realm, rather than a professional silence or the stifling of all conversation with others 
in which race or privilege, for instance, is the topic...One would remain silent to 
prevent one’s whitely perspective from causing further distortion in the political and 
public contexts, where whiteness is most problematic and charged (Vice 2010: 337). 
By drawing this distinction, Vice gives herself and other philosophers (and, presumably, 
other academics more generally) license to engage in writing and other professional 
activities, as well as in personal conversations about race, without falling foul of the silence 
she prescribes with regard to the political sphere. Importantly, Vice applies this prescription 
only to white South Africans who are “tainted by the vicious features of whiteliness” (340), 
hence accommodating, for example, the possibility that “younger generations will 
(appropriately) escape the kind of perplexity I am exploring here” (332). Her prescription is 
otherwise, however, limited only by the distinction she draws between different types of 
silence, based on her distinction between political and professional (or personal) activities. 
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We would question, however, such distinctions  – and hence whether the call for silence 
founded upon them – can be sustained. 
 The blurring of this distinction can be demonstrated with reference to Vice’s own 
argument: It is clearly evident that calling for white South Africans to adopt a humble silence 
with respect to the political realm constitutes on its face a political intervention – a move with 
clear implications for the unfolding of activities in the political sphere. That is, should even a 
small number of white South Africans who would otherwise have sought to express particular 
political positions in a public manner decide to follow Vice’s directive, the result would be – 
for better or worse – a change in the political texture of the country. As a result, the 
ostensibly professional activity in which Vice was engaged in writing the paper to which we 
are responding has clear political implications – the professional and political cannot be 
disentangled. 
 This point can be applied to professional activities more broadly, in at least three 
respects, relating to 1) the historical and contemporary contexts that have contoured and 
continue to shape the politics of professional practice, 2) the context of production of 
professional outputs, and 3) the ways in which such outputs may be appropriated for 
particular purposes following their production. We discuss each of these in the following 
paragraphs. 
 It is not novel to note that professional identities and practices are rooted in 
disciplines, and that these disciplines have histories and political economies of their own 
(Foucault 1997). Moreover, the professionalisation
4
 of many disciplines is highly regulated in 
the present knowledge economy and, as such, is governed by enforceable constitutions and 
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 By professionalisation we are referring to both the recognition of an academic identity as sanctioned, for 
example, by the university affiliation tacked to the name of an author in an academic publication, and the 
‘license’ to identify as a profession via affiliation to particular expert bodies.  
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ethical codes. Even in the case of the so-called non-professional disciplines (philosophy 
being one such discipline), affiliation to a university or other professional organisation 
implies compliance with a certain kind of politics.
5
 The political contours of professional 
identities in the case of disciplines (such as our own discipline of psychology) that are 
mandated to produce “professionals” are far more pronounced. In South Africa, this point has 
been made many times, and abundant evidence has been provided for the ways in which 
psychological theory and practice in the country were born out of racism, and this political 
trajectory continues to shape professional practice in the present. Thus, the early prioritisation 
of the “poor white problem” by the Carnegie Commission of 1928 cannot be but implicated 
in the whiteness that is still reflected in the composition of psychology’s professionals (see 
Table 1 below). This whiteness also characterises most aspects of the professionalisation of 
psychologists (Stevens 2002), from the training they receive (Stevens 2001) based on the 
materials they use (Duncan 2001) to the outputs they produce (Duncan and Bowman 2009).  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
With respect to the context of production, one’s professional activities by necessity 
involve some kind of determination of what kind of activities it is worth engaging in as a 
professional in a particular field. For example, professional academics, in developing an 
ongoing research trajectory and deciding which topic(s) within their field are worthy of their 
professional attention, are unavoidably influenced by their own personal histories, 
perspectives, and values. The contention that a professional discourse is easily divorced from 
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 The mission and vision statements of Rhodes University at 
http://www.ru.ac.za/rhodes/introducingrhodes/visionandmission/ provide useful examples of these political 
parameters for academic identity. 
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a political (or personal) project has been impugned by philosophers,
6
 and is interrogated as a 
matter of methodological routine in many social scientific studies. In fact, assessing the 
degree to which the researcher is aware or reflexive of the ways in which his/her 
“involvement with a particular study influences, acts upon and informs such research” 
(Nightingale and Cromby 1999: 228) has become a widespread mechanism for evaluating the 
quality of social scientific research. Of course, there is much debate on what constitutes 
“involvement,” and therefore on the kinds of reflexivity required to appropriately display an 
awareness of the way in which the political position of the researcher is present in the 
professional outputs of the research (Parker 1994). It is virtually beyond dispute, however, 
that professional outputs cannot be extricated from the political contexts in which they are 
produced.  
In light of the above discussion, and if we accept Vice’s argument that “any voice [for 
white South Africans] in the public sphere would inevitably be tainted by the vicious features 
of whiteliness” (Vice 2010: 340), it follows that white South African social scientists will 
inevitably to some degree import their “whitely” perspectives and values into their 
professional activities. Thus, if we accept that one’s perspectives and values embody a 
political standpoint – a position on matters of contestation particularly, but not only, with 
respect to the way a society should be governed – then professional activities unavoidably 
have political underpinnings and implications. 
 With respect to the appropriation of professional outputs following their production, it 
is clear that professionals cannot retain full control over the uses to which their work is put 
once they have made it publicly available – for example (in the case of academic products) 
                                                          
6 Nietzsche’s insistence that “…[h]owever far man [sic] may extend himself with his knowledge, however 
objective he may appear to himself ultimately he reaps nothing but his own biography” (Nietzsche 1984 [1878]: 
238) exemplifies this point. 
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through publication or presentation at professional meetings. It is well known, for example, 
that although Albert Einstein condemned the use of the atomic bomb against Japan,
7
 and 
warned of the consequences of the wide scale production of nuclear weapons,
8
 his theoretical 
work was central in facilitating the development of the technology upon which such weapons 
depend. Closer to home, it is clear from even a cursory examination of political discourse in 
South Africa that all manner of research findings are recruited to support or undermine 
particular political interventions, with or without the support of the professionals who 
produced the findings – and this includes research relating to the matters of race and redress 
for which Vice’s argument is most particularly salient. An example of this can be seen in the 
reception of a recent report on the continuing racial dimensions of inequality and poverty in 
South Africa (Leibbrandt et al. 2010), which was produced by researchers at the University of 
Cape Town’s Southern African Labour and Development Research Unit on behalf of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The findings of this research 
were quickly seized upon for political ends, as shown by the claims of Athol Trollip (the 
opposition party Democratic Alliance’s parliamentary leader at the time) that the report 
demonstrated the inadequacy of the ANC government’s socio-economic policies.9 
 While the examples provided above focus primarily on the academic domain in which 
Vice and we are embedded, the points that they illustrate could be applied in much the same 
way to activities in a range of other professional domains. Whatever work one does, to the 
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 Einstein stated in a 1953 letter to a Japanese philosopher who had in criticised his role in the development of 
nuclear weapons, “I have always condemned the use of the atomic bomb against Japan” (see Nathan and Norden 
1960: 589).  
8
 Clarke (1971: 698) quotes Einstein as warning in 1944, “when the war is over, then there will be in all 
countries a pursuit of secret war preparations with technological means which will lead inevitably to 
preventative wars and to destruction even more terrible than the present destruction of life.” 
9 
See http://www.iol.co.za/business/business-news/gap-between-rich-and-poor-in-south-africa-widens-1.695882  
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extent that it is produced within a particular discipline, and is (at least in part) a product of 
one’s own decisions regarding what kind of work is worth pursuing, one’s professional 
outputs will reflect a particular political standpoint. And, to the extent that one’s professional 
outputs are in any way relevant to issues being contested in the political realm, these outputs 
could be appropriated in the service of particular political ends. The professional is, 
unavoidably, political. Moreover, this can further be extended to the realm of personal 
activities and conversations which, following similar reasoning, can be shown to have both 
political underpinnings and (at least potentially) political consequences. 
 We are also aware that our arguments regarding the political underpinnings and 
consequences of professional and personal activities could be applied to our own work and 
activities – including the work we are doing in writing this paper. Thus, our work in this 
regard 1) could be taken as reflecting our particular disciplinary roots and socialisation in the 
field of psychology (and the social sciences more broadly), and as implicating the political 
positioning of these disciplines, 2) could be seen as a reflection of our own personal and 
political values, given that by writing this response we are treating Vice’s arguments as 
important enough to respond to, and 3) could, regardless of our intentions in writing it, be 
appropriated as a defense of white South Africans’ right to speak out in any way they please. 
 In the face of the foregoing arguments, white South Africans, including ourselves, are 
faced with a choice: On the one hand, they can either be completely silent in every way – 
which, even if it were practically sustainable, would effectively serve to eliminate any 
contribution that white South Africans could make to society. On the other hand, they can 
speak out, while accepting doing so may have consequences in the political realm, and that 




. This is a fraught state of affairs, and one that is evident in the question that 
serves as the title and topic of Vice’s article. However, it is a state of affairs that we must all 
grapple with one way or another in living our lives as South Africans. It is our contention, 
though, that how we deal with it cannot be prescribed in advance by, for example, a decision 
to adopt (particular “types” of) silence across a range of possible future situations (most 
particularly within the public sphere). Instead, it depends on the contingent, moment-by-
moment choices we make in each new and unique situation, based on the details of the 
situation as we (and others) interpret them (cf. Wittgenstein 's [1958] concept of “finitism”).11 
Again, this can be applied to our own actions in writing this paper: Obviously we have 
chosen to do so despite the potential pitfalls described in the previous paragraph. It is in this 
spirit that we turn now to a brief empirical illustration of the interactional negotiation of the 
place of white South Africans in the post-apartheid society. This example demonstrates how 
everyday contestations around race, and whiteness in particular, relate to Vice’s attempt to 
distinguish between different types of silence, and the contingent, situated, and participant-
administered nature of decisions about whether and when white silence would be appropriate. 
 
III. Contested Whiteness in Political Activities: A Brief Empirical Illustration 
 
The empirical illustration we undertake in this section focuses on an exchange that took place 
on a South African radio station (Kaya FM) in 2008, which was recorded as part of a broader 
study of the ways in which racial categories become relevant in interactional settings in post 
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 McKaiser (2011) advances what seems to be a more nuanced understanding of the role of whites in the 
political sphere. He cautions that political silence by whites may indeed undermine the anti-racist project but 
that whites should remain careful and self-reflective about the ways in which their whiteness and “whiteliness” 
continues to privilege them in post-apartheid South Africa.  
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 This interaction is drawn from a discussion of the controversy 
surrounding the proposed disbanding of the Scorpions crime-fighting unit and the 
incorporation of its duties and personnel into the regular police force. Those familiar with this 
controversy may recall that the Scorpions had been accused of political motivations in 
deciding whether, and in which cases, investigations and potential prosecutions should be 
pursued against political figures accused of corruption – and these accusations were a 
primary basis for the proposed disbanding of the unit. On the show as an invited guest was 
Hugh Glenister, a wealthy (white) businessman who was opposed to the disbanding of the 
Scorpions, and was using his own money to fund a legal intervention aimed at blocking the 
government’s attempts to disband the unit. Clearly, then, this was a highly politically charged 
matter. What was not as clear, however, was whether Glenister’s racial positioning was a 
relevant feature of his intervention: In a lengthy interview preceding the transcript shown 
below, neither Glenister nor the host of the show had given any indication that his actions 
represented a racialised perspective in any respect, but as the transcript
13
 shows, a listener 
(via a text message read on air by the host) suggests otherwise: 
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 See Whitehead (2011a) for further analysis of this exchange, and Whitehead (2010; 2011b; forthcoming) for 
further details and findings relating to the broader study. 
13
 The transcript was produced using the conventions developed primarily by Gail Jefferson, which are 
described in Jefferson (2004). These conventions involve the use of various symbols to represent features of 
speech production, including underlining of words (or portions thereof) to indicate that a speaker has placed 
emphasis on them; numbers in parentheses to represent pauses in speech production (measured in seconds, with 
a single period in parentheses representing a hearable pause of one tenth of a second or less); and dashes to 
indicate that a speaker has cut off the production of a word or sound. For the sake of brevity, the details of the 
roles of these features of speech production are not examined in the following analysis, and they are not crucial 
to the points we wish to make for the purposes of this paper. However, the transcription symbols have been 
retained for the benefit of potentially interested readers. 
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[18 – Kaya FM 5-5-08] 
1 H: Okay and this one, “John your fairly unknown guest is  
2  just a white attention seeker. .h He can use the money  
3  that he amassed because of apartheid to better the lives  
4  of many people, .h instead of this cheap publicity  
5  stunt. .h He can use his riches to make good the victims  
6  of apartheid he has benefitted from. .h The Scorpions  
7  must go.” Okay. (.) One listener .h who’s- you(‘re)  
8  doing completely the wrong thing, .h uh: Hugh Glenister  
9  (a) response? 
10 G: .hhh=pt=.hh (0.2) U:m=hh okay. hhh (.) The wealth I’ve  
11  created in actual fact has (.) actually occurred after  
12  (0.6) u:m: (.) nineteen ninety four. .hhh U:m: (.) and  
13  (.) I was one of those who fought (.) for the very (.)  
14  change that we have in South Africa. .hh Um: (.) the one  
15  concern I have is that I fought very hard against the  
16  previous bunch of bullies in the eighties, .hh a::n:d  
17  the current behavior (0.2) o:f certain people within the  
18  government i- (.) reminds me so much of the eighties,  
19  and that scares me. .hh And that’s why I took the action  
20  that I took. 
21 H: Okay, Dumi is calling from Protea. Hi Dumi? 
 
By claiming that Glenister is “just a white attention seeker” (line 2) and “fairly 
unknown” (line 1), the listener portrays Glenister’s actions as being motivated by a desire to 
gain attention on the part of one who would otherwise not be capable of doing so – and as 
representing a specifically “white” perspective in the process. This portrayal is reinforced by 
the listener’s subsequent claims about the source of Glenister’s wealth, and his/her 
positioning of Glenister as a previous and continuing beneficiary of apartheid (see lines 2-6). 
 13 
Thus, in Vice’s terms, the listener treats Glenister’s actions as “tainted by whiteliness,” and 
hence completely lacking in merit. 
After being invited by the host to respond, Glenister resists the listener’s racialised 
positioning of him. He does so by challenging the listener’s assumption that his wealth was 
amassed during, as opposed to after, apartheid (lines 10-12), claiming to have been an active 
opponent of apartheid (lines 13-14), and drawing a connection between the actions of the 
apartheid regime and those of the current government (lines 16-18). By doing so, he recasts 
his intervention as a principled stand against “bullies” (line 16) in government rather than a 
cynical ploy for attention reflecting a “whitely” position on his part. 
Should Glenister have remained silent, or did his intervention (notwithstanding its 
ultimate lack of success) represent a worthwhile contribution to the debate on this matter? 
Was Glenister exhibiting a “whitely” perspective in his actions in this regard, or did his 
response serve precisely to disrupt the ease with which the caller elided his “whiteness” with 
apartheid-benefit and post-apartheid publicity-seeking? While we may have our own opinions 
on these questions, as might other observers, there can be no final, context-free word on how 
they should be settled. Instead, they are questions for the participants of any given interaction 
to decide on – and while academics (whatever their disciplinary identification may be) may 
“join in” as participants on occasion, our interventions into such contestations are no less 
political than those of other participants. Thus, regardless of any principled statements we 
might make on such matters, the “Hugh Glenisters,” radio listeners, and other members of 
society will have to decide, in any given instance, whether they should remain silent or speak 
out, whether another’s voice is expressing a valid position or is “tainted by whiteliness” – and 
even if academics do make statements in this regard, their interventions will become just 
another factor that participants such as Glenister and the listener may use (or not) in deciding 
what action to take when faced with questions such as these. That is, Glenister could have 
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(had it been available at the time) read Vice’s argument and decided based on doing so that 
he should remain silent. Alternatively, the listener could have invoked Vice as an authority to 
support his claims that that Glenister’s intervention was illegitimate. And it is worth noting 
that either of these possibilities represents an alteration to the political realm resulting from a 
professional philosophical product, thus illustrating again the link between the professional 
and the political we discussed above. However, in such circumstances, it is ultimately the 
actors in every unique scene who will decide whether, and how, a call for silence (or 
otherwise) should be applied. In light of this, rather than attempting to offer prescriptions that 
could be applied to all possible future relevant situations, we could focus our analytic 
attention on working to understand the solutions (imperfect as they may be) that participants 
themselves are producing in particular everyday instances. 
 
IV. Concluding comments 
 
In this response, we have focused on two related points. The first is the difficulty in 
distinguishing between professional, political and personal interventions – and, as we have 
noted, the argument we have made in this regard can be reflexively applied to our own 
contribution to this discussion. We have used a professional academic mode of writing, and 
have drawn on academic sources and analytic methodologies that are part of the tools of our 
professional practice, but we remain aware of the potential political consequences of our 
argument, and are ever cognisant of our positioning as white South Africans (and hence as 
being implicated in Vice’s argument) in writing it. This relates to the second main point of 
our response: Given the difficulties in separating professional, political and personal 
activities, we have demonstrated the value of an empirical analytic focus sensitive to the 
situated ways of being that people – be they identifiable as professionals, political or other 
 15 
public figures, or simply ordinary citizens – are producing in grappling with the contestations 
and complexities of post-apartheid life. Such a focus does not guarantee solutions to the 
fraught position of white people in South African society, but it may offer revealing insights 
into how people are living “in this strange place.” 
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Table 1: Registered professional psychologists in South Africa by race, 2010 
Professional Psychologists in South Africa 
Race Number % 
African 588 8.6 
Chinese 1 0.0 
Coloured 201 2.9 
Indian 371 5.4 
White 3,815 56.0 
(blank) 1,840 27.0 
Total  6,816 100.0 
Source: HPCSA (2010) 
 
